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There is a curious paradox about the Canadian Corps that is summed up in this 
quotation from Canadian Brass, Stephen J. 
Harris’s study of the evolution of a professional 
army in Canada. How did this military organisation 
become so effective in war, considering the 
background it had and the structure that 
supported it for most of its existence? This 
model of tactical excellence was born amid the 
chaos of Canadian Minister of Defence Sam 
Hughes’ egomaniacal control at Valcartier Camp. 
It was beset by jealousies, political backhanders, 
corruption and influence peddling, and saddled 
with favourites as incompetent officers who at 
best were “very weak” and had “no power or habit 
of command.”2 Hughes determined to ensure 
that no Regular soldier received a command 
appointment, and instead put in his favourites. 
These were drawn from the citizen militia, whose 
ability was summed up by the young iconoclast 
and future military theorist J.F.C. Fuller, who 
remarked that the Canadians had potential 
only “if the officers could all be shot.”3 Yet the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) rose above 
this administrative nightmare, even if its impact 
continued to haunt the force for most of its 
existence.
By 1918 the Canadian Corps was the most effective 
fighting formation among the British armies on 
the Western Front, superior in performance to 
its vaunted Australian contemporary in terms 
of organisation, tactical efficiency and staying 
power. This was in large measure due to the 
guiding hand of perhaps the most brilliant corps 
commander of the war, the unlikely, diffident, 
corpulent figure of Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur 
Currie.
Recent historical studies in Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand demonstrate that we are at 
last moving away from what Jeffrey Keshen calls 
“the cult of the superior soldier,”4 one where 
“Johnny Canuck” or “Tommy Cornstalk,” the 
“Aussie,” “Digger,” “Fernleaf ” or “Pig Islander” 
of Australia and New Zealand dominates the 
popular imagination of national achievement and 
identity in each country’s mythology of the First 
World War. Read C.E.W. Bean’s Australian official 
histories,5 or Pierre Berton’s Vimy, and parallel 
images are displayed, of a fierce, individualistic, 
rough-around-the-edges soldier who is also 
somehow self-disciplined and fearless in battle; 
a soldier who is seen as uniquely Australian 
or uniquely Canadian. As an aside, the New 
Zealanders knew they were unique, but never had 
the prophets to proclaim it quite so vehemently, 
although Robin Hyde’s image of James Douglas 
Stark in Passport to Hell comes close.6 As I have 
argued in earlier chapters, something more than 
distinctive national traits accounts for success in 
battle. Examinations of experience on the Western 
Front show that Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand followed parallel paths in the evolution of 
professional citizen expeditionary forces during 
the First World War.
Learning from the Canadian 
Corps on the Western Front
Christopher Pugsley
You can have an entirely civilian army and, if it’s entirely civilian its members 
will be dead before they are good.1
    Brigadier-General (later General) A.G.L. McNaughton
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6This chapter examines some of the points of 
contact between the three dominion forces in 
the Great War, and highlights the influence of the 
Canadian experience. One should not assume 
that the title is influenced by my receiving a 
Canadian Studies Grant for 1998; rather it 
reflects the simple reality that the Canadians 
got to the Western Front first, while the Gallipoli 
Campaign sidelined the Anzacs in 1915. When 
the Anzacs arrived in France in March 1916 the 
Canadians were already veterans in theatre. They 
had demonstrated their prowess in holding the 
line under gas attacks at the second Ypres, when 
the 1st Canadian Division formed part of British 
V Corps in April 1915.7 While the “sideshow” of 
the Anzac landings on Gallipoli were occurring in 
the same week, they were not considered to have 
the same significance as they were far removed 
from what was regarded as the primary theatre of 
conflict.8 Ironically, the formation of the Australia 
and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC Corps) 
was used as the precedent for the drive to form 
the Canadian Corps after the arrival in France of 
the 2nd Canadian Division in September 1915.9
On 5 June 1916, two months after Lieutenant-
General Sir William Birdwood’s I ANZAC Corps 
arrived in France, the first formal Australian 
trench raid on the German lines was mounted by 
combined parties of 26th and 28th Battalion of 
7th Brigade in the Armentières sector of northern 
France. The raid was carefully planned and, as 
C.E.W. Bean recounts:
The whole party was withdrawn for a fortnight 
to a rear area, and there went into training after 
the fashion of a football team before an important 
game. This included a sharp course of physical 
training, and close practice in carrying out its 
raid. A replica of the enemy’s trench, which had 
been photographed from aeroplanes, was dug 
on the training ground and the operation was 
rehearsed again and again until it went almost 
automatically.10
 This was the first of a series of raids mounted 
against the German lines, as preparations for 
the Battle of the Somme further south grew 
in intensity. The British Commander-in-Chief, 
General Sir Douglas Haig, was demanding 
A formidable pair: Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir Julian Byng (left) and his successor as General Officer 
Commanding, Canadian Corps, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie. Both were tactical and organizational innovators 
who forged the Canadian Corps into the outstanding premier corps on the Western Front.
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7every effort all along the trench lines held by the 
British armies to prevent the Germans thinning 
out numbers and sending reinforcements south 
to the Somme front. In taking over the line 
forward of Armentières, the Australians and 
New Zealanders were very conscious of their 
amateur status. The independence that marked 
the Gallipoli Campaign was gone, since in France 
this was regarded as a sideshow and no test of 
worth. Instead, they now numbered five of the 
50 British and dominion divisions of the British 
armies facing the real enemy in the form of the 
German Imperial armies in the trenches of the 
Western Front.
 In mounting this first raid the Australians 
sought outside expertise, requesting assistance 
from the Canadian Corps; as “the Canadians 
were the pioneers in enterprises of this kind, 
two of their officers were borrowed from the 
1st Canadian Division to assist in training the 
team.”11 The New Zealand Division sought similar 
assistance from the Canadians in mounting their 
first raid; the training notes and lesson plans 
used by the New Zealand Division in training 
young officers in patrolling in no-man’s-land, and 
in the techniques of trench raids, were drawn 
from Canadian Corps experience.12 The Anzacs 
had already benefited from their experience after 
receiving grim reports of the Canadian difficulties 
with inadequate camp facilities and the resulting 
breakdown in health during their training on the 
wintry Salisbury Plains over Christmas 1914. 
This had been a significant factor in the decision 
to assemble and train the ANZAC Corps in Egypt 
instead of proceeding on to the United Kingdom. 
Both the Australian and the New Zealand 
Divisions of the ANZAC Corps also requested and 
received reports on operations, administration 
and discipline. This included visiting Canadian 
field punishment centres, as reported in this visit 
to the 1st Canadian Divisional Field Punishment 
Station at Westhof Farm on 31 March 1916.
Prisoners had their heads clipped as soon as 
possible after being admitted … They were 
not allowed to have tobacco, rum, beer, lights, 
or matches, nor were they allowed any other 
food than that issued to them, and in order 
to avoid prisoners smuggling such things into 
their sleeping quarters, it was necessary to 
search each prisoner returning from working 
parties or parades … Any man found guilty of 
insubordination or breaking any rules during the 
days, or who in any way gave trouble — such as 
reporting sick without sufficient cause or being 
found with forbidden articles in his possession 
when searched — was tied up after returning 
from work at night. On one occasion during 
stormy weather some of the prisoners refused to 
work, but the extra punishment of being tied up 
out of doors in a storm and afterwards solitary 
confinement in a dark cell on a diet of bread 
or biscuit and water, prevented recurrences of 
this nature.13
 The draconian methods practised by the 
Canadians impressed the Anzac visitors, and 
were adopted by both the Australians and the 
New Zealanders in the running of their field 
punishment centres. Both Birdwood’s I ANZAC 
Corps and Godley’s II ANZAC Corps were 
conscious that the Canadians were the veterans 
among the dominion forces on the Western Front.
 There had been little pre-war contact; unlike 
Australia and New Zealand, Canada had followed 
the British system of a voluntary militia and had 
not brought in compulsory military training for 
its citizen army. From the outset it had been 
employed in the primary theatre of war on the 
Western Front, and with the arrival of the 2nd 
Canadian Division it became the Canadian 
Corps in September 1915. The continued ad 
hoc expansion of the Canadian Corps beyond 
the resources of the Canadian population to 
effectively sustain it occurred in parallel with the 
expansion of the original ANZAC Corps into two 
corps. In July 1915 the Canadian Government 
planned for an expeditionary force of 150,000. 
In October 1915 this was increased to 250,000 
and on New Year’s Day 1916 the Canadian Prime 
Minister, Sir Robert Borden, announced that 
Canada would raise an army of 500,000.14
 The dangers of this unchecked growth were 
seen by Major-General Willoughby Gwatkin, the 
Canadian Chief of General Staff, who warned 
the government that Canada might not be able 
to find the men to sustain the force once it was 
raised. This warning was ignored by Hughes, 
who bulldozed his demands through, assuring 
the prime minister that the “third division in an 
army corps was almost always in reserve and 
immune from casualties.”15 Equally important 
and equally difficult was finding the staffs needed 
to oversee these fighting formations. Experience 
was lacking at every level but was particularly 
evident within each of the 12 infantry battalions 
from commanding officer to private.
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8 This was also the Anzac experience. In spite 
of the Gallipoli Campaign, the rapid growth of 
the Australian Imperial Forces (AIF) and the 
New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) into 
two corps dangerously stretched the limited 
command and administrative abilities within 
both the Australian and the New Zealand 
forces, particularly when the first elements were 
dispatched to France barely six weeks after being 
raised. Early May 1916 saw them in the trenches 
in the “nursery” sector at Armentières conscious 
of their lack of experience, determined to do 
well, and keen to seek advice. That they turned 
to the Canadians for this was inevitable. It too 
was a dominion citizens army raised in similar 
circumstances to their own. The Kitchener 
New Army divisions, which had been raised in 
similar circumstances, had been found wanting 
in Anzac eyes on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Being 
British divisions they did not face the unique 
demands of establishing administrative bases 
for reinforcement and training in the United 
Kingdom, or of dealing with national concerns 
of pay, mail, administration, welfare and the 
provision of reinforcements. Both Anzac forces 
were keen to learn from Canadian mistakes. 
While administratively the Canadian system 
in Britain was initially a chaotic bottleneck, 
exemplifying Hughes’ interference and meddling, 
the Canadians’ fighting reputation became the 
benchmark to aspire to. Both the AIF and the 
NZEF were determined to match the Canadian 
achievement and have the best divisions on the 
Western Front.
 The “nursery” experience of May to August 
1916 was anything but easy for the two ANZAC 
corps. They were ill-prepared for the demands 
placed upon them by the Somme offensive. The 
constant raids, the extended divisional frontages, 
and prolonged tours of duty in the trenches came 
close to breaking the inexperienced divisions. 
They were learning the hard way what the 
Canadians had learnt in the previous 12 months; 
that poor administration and a lack of leadership 
led to disciplinary problems characterised by 
skyrocketing courts martial, principally for 
absenteeism and drunkenness. As we have 
seen, inexperienced Anzac officers attacked 
the symptoms rather than the causes, and by 
tightening discipline rather than improving 
welfare and administration saw disciplinary 
statistics continue to rise. When the ANZAC corps 
arrived in 1916, courts martial in the Canadian 
divisions averaged 40 a month compared to over 
a hundred in each of the Australian and New 
Zealand divisions. However, this disciplinary 
pattern exactly parallelled the Canadian 
experience of 1915; they too had problems in the 
first 12 months, until the Canadian Headquarters 
improved its skills in managing its growing force 
of what were now three divisions, a fourth joining 
by late 1916. Twelve months later, in 1917, with 
more experience and better administration, the 
Canadian, Australian and New Zealand divisional 
disciplinary statistics were similar. Each national 
force was fiercely competitive and determined to 
improve. Each was aware that standards were 
judged not only by performance in battle, but 
also by standards of drill, discipline and saluting. 
Despite what one would like to believe today, each 
national force demanded conformity within its 
ranks to the standards of the British armies in 
which they served.
 On the Western Front in 1916 and 1917 the 
dominion forces were made up of hard men 
facing hard times, and as the description of 
the Canadian field punishment centre shows, if 
soldiers did not conform they were broken as an 
example to the rest. This also applied to capital 
punishment, which saw soldiers who were found 
guilty of capital offences such as mutiny and 
desertion risk facing the firing squad. All three 
national forces were equally hard on those who 
deserted and threatened their good name. All 
three displayed a willingness to impose the death 
sentence by courts martial made up of citizen 
officers of each force standing in judgement of 
their own.  
 Tactically the Canadians showed a superiority 
gained through their longer experience on the 
Western Front. In 1916 both the Australians 
and the New Zealanders showed their lack 
of command and tactical skills. The attack 
at Fromelles on 19–20 July at a cost of 5533 
casualties was a disaster for 5th Australian 
Division, one that would take the rest of the 
year and a change in command to recover from. 
Equally, on the Somme the calibre of the men 
could not compensate for poor command and 
staff skills in the Anzac formations. All three 
dominion forces employed the stereotyped 
infantry wave tactics, which although successful 
when employed with the developments in artillery 
tactics such as the creeping or rolling barrage, 
came with a fearful cost — an average on the 
Somme of 7400 in each division.
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9 Popular belief portrays the Western Front as 
a place where unimaginative generals, totally out 
of touch and secure in their chateaux kilometres 
behind the front line, sent soldiers to their deaths 
in frontal assault after frontal assault. “Lions 
led by donkeys” and “Butcher Haig” are clichés 
cemented in public consciousness. In recent years 
there has been a sea-change in thinking among 
military historians. In discussing the influence 
of the Canadian Corps on Anzac thinking, and 
indeed on the British armies as a whole, let me 
first explain the revolution in tactical doctrine 
that occurred on the Western Front, one that 
irrevocably changed the nature of warfare. It 
was a revolution in tactics that was overseen by 
the “donkeys” of generals who we still identify 
as “butchers,” and perhaps suggests that they 
achieved more than we credit them with. This is 
certainly my belief, so let me expand on this.
 The problem the British armies faced on the 
Western Front was one that had been evident to 
discerning military minds since the American 
Civil War. The advent of massed rifle fire 
increased the effective infantry killing range from 
80 metres for a musket to 250–300 metres for 
a breech-loading, magazine-fed, bolt-action rifle. 
This has not changed, and at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century this is still the laid-down 
killing range for infantry personal weapons.
 The British Army appreciated this after the 
hard lessons of the Boer War, and section rushes 
(essentially “fire and movement,” which is the 
essence of military tactics today) within half 
companies, there being no platoon organisation, 
became the tactical means of closing with an 
enemy. The fire fight had then to be won by 
massed rifle fire and British infantry were 
trained to fire 15 rounds rapid in the first deadly 
minute, with their bolt-action Lee-Enfield rifles, 
before the final attack on the enemy with rifle 
and bayonet. This was matched by a change in 
organisation in the infantry battalion from the 
eight-company structure — so effective for the 
linear formations that had been the underpinning 
strength of British drill and tactical manoeuvre 
from Wellington’s successes in the Napoleonic 
Wars and in the colonial wars that followed 
— to four double-strength companies, each of 
four platoons. This was the organisation with 
which the British armies and the dominion 
expeditionary forces went to war.
 This was a radically new organisation that 
put a junior officer or subaltern in charge of 
40–50 men, who were further subdivided into 
four sections, each of 10–12 soldiers under the 
command of an NCO. Platoons had not existed 
in the British battalion organisation before this, 
and how it was to work was still being evolved 
when the British Army went to war in 1914.16 
 The small British Expeditionary Force 
(BEF) demonstrated the benefits of both the 
organisation and their tactical skills in the 
opening defensive battles of Mons and Le 
Cateau, and again in the struggle to hold on to 
Ypres in October and November 1914, which 
led to the destruction of this professional elite. 
The dominion expeditionary forces mobilised 
to reinforce the BEF initially trained in these 
skills in 1914. As photographs in the Alexander 
Turnbull Library show, the Wellington Infantry 
Battalion, for example, practised section and 
platoon rushes over the sand dunes near 
Miramar where Wellington International Airport 
now stands. Those who now decry what they see 
as outdated Boer War tactics, blaming them for 
the formalised slaughter on the Somme in 1916, 
fail to realise that the evolution of these same 
tactics of section and platoon rushes to avoid 
The desolate battlefield – tangled banks of barbed wire covered by rifle, artillery and machine gun fire from the shelter of 
trenches presented a tactical problem that had to be solved if infantry were to attack successfully on the Wester Front.
LAC PA 4394
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10
presenting the defending riflemen with a massed 
target was the secret of the British armies’ success 
in 1918. It was the British failure to retain these 
tactical skills in the raising and training of the 
mass citizen armies that led to the slaughter on 
the Somme on 1 July 1916. The small-group 
tactical doctrine used in the British Army of 1914 
was perfectly suitable for closing with the enemy 
on the Western Front, but it was a skill that was 
lost with the destruction of the professional army 
at Ypres and had to be relearned and reapplied 
through hard experience.
 Regular British soldiers at Mons and 
Le Cateau in 1914 were surprised that the 
attacking German formations made little attempt 
to advance across the fire zone by fire and 
movement in section and platoon rushes, as the 
British had been taught. Instead they attacked in 
massed ranks and suffered for it. The German 
attack method showed the reality of the state 
of tactical skill of a European conscript army, 
but one where a lack of tactical skill within 
regiments was compensated for by the higher-
level operational and administrative skills of 
its General Staff. Those British Regulars who 
survived the first months of fighting would see 
the level of training and skills that they took for 
granted within their battalion become diluted and 
deteriorate to the same levels they witnessed in 
the German ranks in 1914. It takes time to train 
a small group to work in pairs, with one soldier 
firing as the other rushes forward, and with a 
section of 10–12 men working in pairs rushing 
forward while covered by the rifle fire of other 
sections. Replicate this with the platoons moving 
forward in the same manner, covered by other 
platoons, and the same at company level, and you 
begin to recognise the degree of professional skill 
required to do it in battle army wide. The British 
Army of 1914 had this skill; its successors from 
the Territorial and New Armies did not, and had 
to find it, but before they could do so they had 
to appreciate its importance; all of this evolved 
by trial and error.
 Kitchener’s New Armies were made up of 
the finest material ever seen in a British army. It 
was of a calibre that would never be seen again, 
certainly not in the Second World War where the 
competing demands of the Royal Navy and the 
RAF, and the growth of specialist arms in the 
army, meant the infantry arm received what was 
left over after the cream had been skimmed off. 
The vast potential of Kitchener’s citizen armies 
was fitfully used. The army administration that 
existed in Britain was barely able to house and 
feed the influx of recruits let alone provide the 
degree of training needed at every level from 
soldier to commanding officer.
 A citizen army whose training had to 
be entrusted to long-retired veterans 
unfamiliar with the tactical evolution that 
had occurred since the Boer War was 
trained in mass and used in mass in the 
linear formations of the nineteenth century. 
The trainers had not the knowledge or the 
experience of the tactics that had evolved 
since the end of the war in 1902, and they 
trained the New Armies in those drills that 
had been effective in the small colonial 
wars that had been their experience. They 
had never experienced the four-infantry-
company-strong battalion organisation, 
nor were they familiar with the new platoon 
organisation. They were used to operating 
The machine gun formed the backbone of the 
defensive fire plan as it was capable of placing a 
wall of fire effective out to 1800 metres, through 
which infantry had to pass if they were to gain the 
German trenches. Here, Lietuenant-General Sir 
Julian Byng examines some German machine 
guns captured during the Arras offensive, May 
1917.
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in companies and half-companies and were too 
old to change. The so-called “Boer War” tactics 
of section and platoon rushes standard in the 
Regular Army and aspired to by the dominion 
forces were allowed to lapse, and were replaced 
by the formalised lines of advancing infantry that 
were shot down in their rows by German machine 
guns on the Somme on 1 July 1916.
 The infantry assault was a task made much 
more difficult by the defensive firepower of the 
machine guns that now formed the backbone of 
the defensive fire plan in the trench lines along 
the Western Front. Belt-fed, effective out to 1800 
metres and firing on fixed lines by day or night, 
they provided a continuous stream of bullets 
through which flesh and blood had to pass before 
men could attempt to cross the belts and tangled 
mass of barbed wire that protected the German 
trenches. A man could stand up and walk 
forward, laden with 30 kg of webbing, equipment, 
accoutrements, ammunition, grenades, rifle and 
bayonet, but did not have the training or the 
tactical skill to suppress, isolate and destroy the 
machine guns that barred his way. Enthusiasm 
was not enough, and even this vanished after the 
first slaughter to be replaced by an overwhelming 
desire on the part of every individual to survive 
and return home. Weight of materiel in the 
shape of massed artillery fire was the answer 
to opening the way for infantry to advance, but 
on the Somme this was still a blunt instrument. 
There was little coordination — only a blind belief 
that the sheer weight of shellfire must destroy the 
German defences. Artillery techniques improved 
markedly as the Battle of the Somme progressed. 
These started to provide the essentials needed 
to keep the attacking infantryman alive as he 
advanced by first destroying the wire that blocked 
his advance, then by suppressing enemy artillery 
fire while he advanced and secured his objective, 
and also by giving him covering fire to mask his 
movement while he moved forward.
 Yet artillery support was only one of the key 
elements in achieving tactical success on the 
Western Front. Artillery fire cannot be brought 
down closer than some 130 metres from your 
advancing troops. Think about what that means 
if you are attacking across a boggy, recently 
ploughed paddock towards a distant fence line 
representing the German front line. Now picture 
yourself with a rifle and bayonet, webbing, 
water bottle, 200 rounds of ammunition, 
entrenching tool, grenades, iron rations, and so 
on, all weighing about 30 kilograms. How long 
would it take you to walk or jog this distance? 
Three or four minutes? More? Artillery fire has 
covered your approach up to this point, but if 
it continues to fire as you go forward you run 
the real risk of being killed by the explosion of 
your own shells. At 130 metres it has to lift and 
move away from you. How long will it take you to 
cover this distance and what is the enemy at the 
Success on the Western Front was brought by a marriage of improved artillery and artillery and infantry tactics and 
organisational changes that took advantage of technical developments. Here a Canadian 18-pounder gun team loads 
its limbers for the next mission, May 1918.
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fence line likely to be doing? In essence, that is 
the problem that faced attacking infantry on the 
Western Front; at some point when close to the 
enemy they had to advance over the last critical 
metres of ground without artillery support.
 The importance of fire and movement at 
platoon level was the tactical revolution that led 
to the breaking of the trench deadlock. The skills 
of 1914 and the lessons of the Boer War had to 
be relearned by amateur armies commanded 
by Regulars who had never had to think on this 
scale, so it was a learning process for all.17 The 
story of the First World War on the Western Front 
is one of the evolving professionalism of citizen 
armies over four years from 1915 onwards, and 
the dominion forces shared that process with the 
Canadian Corps leading the way.
 The best of the divisional and corps 
commanders evaluated the Somme experience 
and profited from it. This was certainly true of 
Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir Julian 
Byng’s Canadian Corps. Bill Rawling’s detailed 
study in Surviving Trench Warfare shows the 
growth in tactical development between the 
Somme and the Canadian attack on Vimy Ridge 
in April 1917. Rawling’s careful evaluation, 
which minutely examines both relative success 
and failure, is a record of outstanding Canadian 
achievement that places it at the forefront of 
the tactical revolution that was occurring in the 
British armies on the Western Front.18
 The Canadians were fortunate in the calibre 
of their British corps commander, “Bungo” Byng, 
who took command of the corps in May 1916 
after his predecessor proved more expendable 
than failed Canadian divisional and brigade 
commanders.19 With a reputation of being a 
“cheerfully unintellectual cavalryman,” Byng 
proved to be anything but, demonstrating a tactical 
grasp that places him at the forefront of British 
generals on the Western Front.20 It is clear from 
his directives that he was a practical, thinking 
general who in his eight months in command 
of the Canadian Corps was determined to work 
out how to attack successfully at minimum cost. 
Equally importantly, he understood the particular 
nature of the men he commanded. He recognised 
that a citizen army had to be treated and trained 
differently from Regulars, noting that it was 
important for senior officers to become involved 
at levels that would not be contemplated in a 
Regular formation but, “when so many Senior 
Officers in Battalions are still inexperienced, 
the interference even of Corps and Divisional 
Commanders in the training of the Platoon was 
beneficial.”21
 Directives from above were not enough when 
inexperience at every level of command down to 
private soldier meant that the few professionals 
who knew what to do had to get involved and by 
hands-on involvement and advice teach staffs 
and units the business of both how to manage 
fighting and the business of fighting itself. This 
Two tanks belch smoke as they move forward during the Amiens offensive, 9 August 1918. Tanks were too slow and 
mechanically unreliable to be an effective breakthrough weapon, but provided valuable support to infantry in crushing 
barbed wire and destroying machine gun posts.
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was the reality in every dominion force. Byng 
also recognised and preached that it was at 
platoon level that the key to tactical success in 
breaking the trench deadlock was to be found. 
He was not alone. Throughout Haig’s armies 
commanders and staffs were assessing the 
lessons of the Somme, and fighting and thinking 
commanders at army, corps and divisional 
level were suggesting changes. Led by Haig, his 
army commanders Plumer, Rawlinson and even 
the much-maligned Gough in Fifth Army knew 
there had to be a better way and groped towards 
solutions.
 The Canadian Corps staff, pondering on 
the lessons of the Somme, sent Major-General 
Arthur Currie to visit the French at Verdun and 
assess their organisation and training. As a 
result organisational changes were made to the 
platoon structure within the infantry battalions 
that would anticipate army-wide changes in the 
months ahead.22 Currie’s report from Verdun, 
as Hyatt explains in his incisive biography of 
this little-appreciated general, was not just a 
record of what he saw of the French organisation 
and tactics. It was more an evaluation of what 
the Canadians had learnt from what they had 
done wrong in the fighting around Pozières after 
replacing the Australians in late September 
1916. It was a thoughtful assessment of how the 
organisation, communication and training had 
to improve within the corps, both in terms of 
the infantry who carried out the attack and in 
what the artillery needed to do to ensure they 
could get forward.23 Currie’s notes are rich in 
detail that one recognises became integral to 
British tactical doctrine; indeed, much of it was 
already being practised and experimented with. 
He summarised the primary factors behind 
successful French offensive operations as “careful 
staff work,” thorough “artillery preparation and 
support,” the “element of surprise,” and the “high 
state of training in the infantry detailed for the 
assault.”24
 Currie was impressed by the fact that the 
French were producing what he termed ““storm” 
troops on a large scale.” If one looks at its 
subsequent adoption in the British armies, one 
can see that by late 1917 every British soldier was 
trained in the tactical skills of fire and manoeuvre. 
It is this scale of training that marks the critical 
difference between the Allied approach and that 
of the Germans, where the Stosstruppen, or 
specialist storm-trooper, remained an elite and 
the German Imperial Armies suffered for it.25 
Crucial to this was the need to improve tactical 
skills within the infantry battalions. Currie noted 
in his report: 
Too often, when our infantry are checked, 
they pause and ask for additional [artillery] 
preparation before carrying on. This artillery 
preparation cannot be quickly and easily 
arranged for and is often not necessary. Our 
troops must be taught the power of manoeuvre 
and that before giving up [and asking for more 
artillery support] they must employ to the utmost 
extent all the weapons with which they are armed 
and have available.26
 Both Byng and his Canadian subordinates 
appreciated that the Somme fighting had 
demonstrated “that the present organization 
and training of our Infantry have not succeeded 
in developing the maximum offensive firepower 
bestowed by the weapons with which it is now 
armed.”27 Where it was going wrong was with a 
lack of effective fire and movement at platoon 
level. The critical problem was that you could not 
keep artillery firing until the infantry reached the 
enemy trenches because if you did, you would kill 
your own men. As discussed above, the closest 
the infantry could come was 130 metres before 
the supporting artillery had to lift and move 
away from the attacking troops. This was the 
problem facing any attack on the Western Front, 
as these minutes gave the enemy time to react 
and man his trenches and machine guns. It was 
in these critical minutes that the infantryman 
had to fight his way forward with the weapons 
he had at hand; artillery could no longer directly 
assist him. It was Byng’s assessment that once 
the supporting artillery fire lifted then success or 
failure depended on how effectively the platoons 
dealt with the machine guns and obstacles in 
front of them. As he wrote:
The largest unit that, under modern conditions, 
can be directly controlled and manoeuvred 
under fire by one man is the Platoon. The Platoon 
Commander is therefore in most cases, the only 
man who can personally influence the local 
situation. In fact, it is not too much to say that 
this is the Platoon Commander’s war. Realizing 
this, it becomes the duty of the Company 
Commander to see that each Platoon is trained 
by its leader to act either with independence or 
as a component of the Company. In each case 
the fullest development of all the various Infantry 
weapons should be the object to be achieved.28
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 The problem was that the existing four-
platoon structure in a rifle company based on 
50-strong platoons was too inflexible. It became a 
means of administration rather than an effective 
command, giving the platoon commander “no 
command worthy of the name and little or no 
opportunity of training either his men or himself 
to realize their capabilities.” Changes were 
needed to the platoon organisation, making it 
smaller and more adaptable yet still giving it 
both the numbers and the specialist skills needed 
to make best use of the weapons technology 
available.29 Inexperienced commanders both at 
company and platoon level did not know what 
was required of them, and fell into the trap of 
centralising command at company level and not 
using the platoons as tactical and organisational 
sub-units within the company.
 Byng directed that in the Canadian Corps 
infantry platoons were to consist of a platoon 
headquarters and four sections with a maximum 
strength of 44, and at least 28 strong, which he 
regarded as the working minimum. Each of the 
four sections had to have “its own leader, and 
an understudy.” One section was to be Lewis 
gunners, to give the immediate fire support with 
the Lewis light machine gun to the other three 
sections; one was to be a bombing section armed 
with hand grenades; while the other two sections 
were to be riflemen, and would also include a 
number of rifle grenadiers firing rifle grenades. 
In effect there was one fire support section based 
on the Lewis gun to give covering fire, with three 
manoeuvre sections to fight their way forward 
covered by that fire. The gas-operated magazine-
fed Lewis machine gun gave the British a genuine 
man-portable weapon with the firepower to assist 
infantry in the attack. Its adoption revolutionised 
the fire support available within a platoon. Its 
firepower more than matched the rifle fire of 
the entire platoon; the principal problem was 
carrying enough of the 47-round-capacity circular 
magazines to keep it firing.
 Byng saw it as essential that “the Platoon 
should constitute a unit for fighting and training, 
and should consist of a homogeneous combination 
of all the weapons with which the Infantry is now 
armed.” The key to success was maintaining the 
strength of the rifle platoons. Battalions out of the 
line had to give priority to platoon training, and 
ensure that platoons were kept up to strength, 
avoiding the tendency to drain off platoon 
manpower for appointments in battalion. Corps 
schools were set up to train instructors, and to 
train officers and NCOs in the skills that were 
required. In particular Byng wanted to achieve 
the following levels of expertise:
(i) Train the Platoon Commander in handling 
his Platoon, not only in a set piece previously 
rehearsed, but in dealing with unforeseen 
situations such as must occur both in attack 
and defence.
(ii) Train every man in the platoon to act in case 
of necessity as specialist, i.e., as a bomber, rifle 
grenadier, or Lewis gunner.30
This platoon-level revolution was adopted army-
wide in February 1917 with directives from Haig’s 
General Headquarters. It was these directives 
that led to the new platoon structure being 
introduced into the New Zealand Division and 
its Australian counterparts in I and II ANZAC 
Corps, but as we have seen the Canadians had 
already anticipated its need and introduced its 
recommendations.31 Once again it is easy to 
direct from above, but it was the willingness to 
adopt these changes and make them effective 
within the division that marked out the better 
divisions. How difficult this was for a British 
division in the line is captured by Lieutenant 
Colonel Cecil Allanson, who commanded the 
6th Gurkhas in the August offensive of 1915, 
where he was wounded and recommended for 
the Victoria Cross. In early 1917 he was GSO1 
of the 57th Division that was just arriving in 
France when he was informed of the changes to 
the platoon organisation. He was very critical 
that this instruction had not reached him in 
England “so that our final training could have 
been carried out under these conditions. With 
a division spread out along miles of trenches, 
reorganisation is difficult, and will receive but 
scanty attention — from force of circumstance 
— by experienced officers.”32
 It was here that the Canadians took the 
lead, and with Byng’s drive ensured that the 
changes became standard in all four Canadian 
divisions. This was possible because the 
Canadian Corps was unique in having a fixed 
homogeneous grouping. The only other corps 
similar to this were the two ANZAC corps, but 
even in these, additional divisions were attached 
for operations and Australian divisions were 
interchanged between I and II ANZAC. But it was 
not only having the willingness to change that was 
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essential; divisions such as the 57th Division also 
needed the time, and inevitably this was often left 
to training periods out of the line.
 The Canadian Corps’ attack on Vimy on 9 
April 1917, Easter Monday, as part of the Arras 
offensive, showed what an infantry-based army 
could achieve with detailed preparation and 
planning and the coordination of all available 
resources. It was a demonstration of how much 
Byng and his Canadians had learnt from the mud 
and chaos of the Somme fighting. The Vimy Ridge 
north of Arras was critical ground on which the 
German defensive line hinged. It had successfully 
denied a series of French attacks at bloody 
cost. The four Canadian divisions advanced 
side by side in battle for the first time under a 
creeping artillery barrage, assisted by specially 
dug communication tunnels that allowed the 
attacker to move close to the German front lines. 
Counterbattery fire silenced the German artillery, 
and most of the critical ground except that on 
which the Vimy Memorial now stands was gained 
in the first few hours of battle. The toll exacted 
was high: 3598 killed and 7004 wounded.33 But 
the Canadian victory at Vimy showed that it was 
possible to break in and seize heavily defended 
ground with platoon-based tactics assisted by 
engineering skills, and the skilled use of artillery 
in destroying the wire, providing an effective 
creeping barrage and counter-battery fire.
 Limited gains at heavy cost, which historians 
today believe to be part of Haig’s battle of attrition 
mind-set, were the reality of manoeuvring an 
infantry-based army dependent on fighting their 
way forward on foot in a geographically restricted 
area defended by mass armies. Both attacker and 
defender were able to stockpile and use materiel 
and technology, but by its nature the ground gave 
greater advantages to the defender. The tank, 
which was introduced for the first time on the 
Somme on 15 September 1916, was a major 
technological advance but lacked the robustness 
and manoeuvrability to make it a battle winner. 
It could not keep up with infantry over broken 
ground, and its lack of suspension and poor 
exhaust extraction meant that its crew was unfit 
for combat after one hour’s cross-country travel. 
Until this problem was overcome the role of the 
tank was limited to infantry support.
Canadian soldiers returning from the trenches during the Battle of the Somme, November 1916.
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 Breaking through the trench lines of the 
Western Front was by necessity a battle of 
tactical-level small-scale manoeuvre, but because 
it was not one of sweeping breakthroughs this 
manoeuvre has not been recognised for what it 
was. Improved offensive tactics, particularly in 
the use of artillery, saw the evolution of German 
defensive doctrine from the fixed trench lines of 
the Somme to defence in depth by zones based 
on a chequerboard pattern of concrete bunkers 
or pillboxes, protected by wire obstacles often 
hundreds of metres in depth. These channelled 
the attacker into the mutually supporting 
crossfires of this matrix of mini-forts, behind 
which specially designated infantry units were 
held ready to counterattack.
 Fighting forward in short dashes covered by 
the fire of the Lewis gun team was an exhausting 
business even without the need and the strain of 
taking out each German machine-gun position 
and bunker. Each required a platoon attack 
within the framework of a company attack which 
was in turn part of a battalion attack within the 
brigade plan that was part of the divisional attack, 
and so on through corps to army! It was the 
means by which infantry could take on the dug-
in enemy successfully and keep going forward. It 
was physically demanding work that burnt up the 
energies of the individuals taking part, so after 
each bunker or trench had been taken platoons 
had to leapfrog through each other to keep the 
advance progressing. This meant that what each 
battalion could achieve in terms of metres of 
ground gained (with its four rifle companies each 
of four platoons) was by necessity very limited.
 An infantry division of three brigades usually 
attacked with two brigades side by side, each 
having its battalions echeloned in depth so that 
each took a bite out of the objective the brigade 
had been given, fighting its way forward behind 
the artillery barrage to a predetermined line. At 
this point it paused and consolidated while the 
next battalion passed through and continued to 
fight forward. From above this would appear to 
be a dispersed series of ant-like columns edging 
forward, but this was the reality of an organised 
mass of men across a frontage of a kilometre or 
two, biting its way into a highly sophisticated 
defensive system that was designed to impede and 
kill. Thousands of men were needed to achieve 
hundreds of metres, not through ignorance on the 
part of their commanders but through the reality 
that at the fighting edge of this advance, small 
groups of 30 or so infantrymen were fighting 
their way forward platoon by platoon, section by 
section, in small difficult bites across this front.
 Artillery fire was critical in allowing the 
infantry to move forward. Four things were 
essential to any attack, and these were things 
that artillery had to provide. The wire obstacles 
protecting the German defences had to be 
cut to allow the infantry to get through. The 
infantry had to have covering fire so that the 
German defenders were forced to keep their 
heads down to the last possible moment, but 
equally importantly the German artillery had to 
be suppressed by counter-battery fire while the 
attack was in progress. Infantry were at their 
most vulnerable while they were above ground, 
so the planning staff had to ensure that for the 
critical period of the attack, during the infantry 
advance, every effort was made to stop the 
German artillery from firing. Finally, defensive 
fire had to be available to destroy German 
counterattacks while the attackers consolidated 
and put into a state of defence the ground they 
had won in the attack.
 Covering fire was achieved by the evolution 
of the creeping barrage that became standard 
procedure in the British and French armies from 
the Somme on. This became a sophisticated mix 
of a moving line of exploding artillery shells, 
sometimes mixed with smoke shells that lifted 
in 25-, 50- or 100-yard leaps and moved forward 
as a curtain of fire and explosions ahead of 
the infantry who had been trained in and had 
practised moving forward behind this covering 
fire.
 A limiting factor in how far an attack could 
go was the range of the artillery. The standard 
supporting field gun in British divisions was 
the 18-pounder. For most of the war its effective 
range was 6500 yards. Even if positioned as far 
forward as possible, this could be 1000–2000 
yards behind a front line. The planning staff 
also had to factor in being able to effectively use 
artillery to defeat German counterattacks while 
the attacking infantry consolidated the ground 
they had won. Artillery had to be able to reach 
out and fire on the German attackers in front of 
the newly won positions. There was no guarantee 
that artillery would be able to be moved forward 
into new positions to provide this support, so 
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objectives had to be within range of existing 
artillery positions. If one allows 1000 yards as 
the minimum distance that was needed in front 
of the furthest advance then one can see that 
by subtracting from the field gun’s 6500-yard 
planning range the 2000–3000 yards that is the 
combined length of the distance of the guns to 
the front line and the distance that the guns had 
still to cover after the infantrymen had reached 
their farthest objective, what is left is a maximum 
3500-yard template within which to plan the 
infantry attack. Often this was in fact much less, 
commonly 1000–2000 yards. If one wanted to 
achieve more than this then the attack had to 
be carried out in stages so that provision could 
be made to get artillery forward so that it could 
support a further advance. Balanced against this 
was the sophistication of the German defences, 
whose series of defensive zones could cover a 
depth of six to ten kilometres. Taking all this 
into account, the scale of the problem facing the 
attacker on the Western Front becomes obvious. 
The Germans looked at the distance from which 
British artillery could support an attack and did 
everything in their defensive planning to frustrate 
it. The Germans provided an “onion skin” defence 
in layers that the attacker had to piece and work 
his way through, each layer being separated by 
belts of barbed wire covered by machine-gun fire. 
While he was doing this he would be subject to 
German artillery fire and infantry counterattacks.
 Getting artillery forward through these layers 
was a major undertaking that required roads 
to be built through what was often a churned 
up, trackless waste blocked by the obstacles of 
enemy wire, trenches in depth, and the fact that 
the German artillery was now bombarding the 
ground that they had lost. Horses had to drag 
the guns forward, together with the hundreds of 
rounds needed for each gun, as well as the timber 
needed to build stable platforms in the ground 
to prevent guns sinking into the earth each time 
they fired. Moving the mass of materiel needed 
was a major engineering and logistic undertaking 
that demanded staff planning and direction of the 
highest order. It was where corps staff proved 
their mettle. The Canadian Staff was a mix of 
British professionals and Canadian officers, 
some professional, some not, but the Canadians 
also had the benefit of experience. It was with this 
combination that the Canadian Corps in 1917 
proved greatly superior to its two ANZAC Corps 
counterparts.
 All of this was the reality of achieving infantry 
manoeuvre at foot pace. Its cost in manpower 
and materiel, or more evocatively “attrition,” 
was far higher than if one could have devised a 
way of getting round the German defences and 
attacking them from the flank or rear, but the 
Western Front did not allow this. The Belgian 
coast and the Swiss frontier fixed the parameters. 
Manoeuvre had to be achieved within the context 
of a frontal attack that had the aim of breaking 
in and punching its way through the German 
lines. German defensive planning ensured that 
the depth of defences forced the attacker to 
exhaust his infantry in fighting forward and also 
deploy his artillery forward in stages while he 
was fighting through the objective, so there was 
no alternative but to work through the German 
defences in small tactical bites dictated by the 
range of artillery support.
Canadian soldiers enjoy a mid-day meal, July 1917.
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 The evolution of counter-battery fire 
techniques, with the ability to locate German 
artillery batteries by aerial and ground spotters, 
and with the introduction of flash spotting 
and sound-ranging techniques, was a critical 
part of evolving Allied offensive tactics. Byng 
was a driving force in having these techniques 
introduced into the Canadian Corps in the 
preparation before Vimy.34 This allowed the 
infantry to get forward and survive above ground 
during the critical hours of the actual attack by 
suppressing German defensive artillery fire.
 Some historians, led by Robin Prior and 
Trevor Wilson in their important studies of the 
Western Front, see this as central to explaining 
Allied success on the Western Front to the 
exclusion of all other factors.35 The Australian 
historian Ashley Ekins, who is of this school, has 
written that:
…success would come to whichever side 
possessed the capacity to direct massive artillery 
damage onto their enemy’s front and provide 
artillery cover to enable their own infantry to 
advance. The crucial factor was no longer the 
infantry, or their strength, condition, training, 
morale or state of discipline. Victory now 
depended upon the number of guns and shells 
and the intensity of shelling which could be 
applied to the chosen area of attack.36
 I disagree. It is an argument similar to that 
advanced by contemporary air power advocates 
who believe that wars can be won by air power 
alone. In the twenty-first century “smart” shells 
guided by lasers from guns positioned by GPS 
have been developed; these can guarantee that 
artillery can hit a pinpoint target. That was 
not the case in the First World War. For all the 
technological advances that artillery achieved, it 
remained an area weapon that could accurately 
bracket a 250 x 250 yard area with the shells 
of a battery, depending on calibre, weight of 
shell and number of guns employed, but it 
could not guarantee destruction. Sustained 
fire over a prolonged period might eventually 
achieve this, but what artillery could promise 
was neutralisation; keeping the defenders’ 
heads down for a specified period. It is this 
limitation that Prior and Wilson appear to ignore. 
Unquestionably, the war on the Western Front was 
a war of materiel in which artillery was of central 
importance. Infantry could not succeed without 
artillery.
 “Artillery destroys while infantry occupies” 
is the catch cry that emerges from the Western 
Front, but for infantry to occupy still demanded 
the skill of fighting through the objective from 
the point once artillery support had to lift. For, 
despite the increased accuracy of the guns, the 
introduction of the 106 fuse that allowed the 
18-pounders to be more effective in cutting wire, 
and the greater percentage of heavy artillery 
that destroyed trenches and rendered German 
defenders in pillboxes concussed and senseless 
from the pounding, total destruction was 
impossible.
 The act of occupation is not simply standing 
up and walking forward, as too many historians 
suggest. The revolution on the Western Front was 
one of the growing sophistication of the all arms 
team built around the growing skills of infantry in 
attack. Allied skills in massing and using artillery 
were a critical feature in their offensive success, 
but if this had not been matched by the evolution 
of infantry small-group tactics at section and 
platoon level then, once the artillery fire lifted, 
the infantry would have been stopped by machine 
guns and would have died in their extended lines 
as they did on the Somme on 1 July 1916.
 Victory in battle depended on maintaining 
the balance between the artillery and its ability 
to “direct massive artillery damage” onto the 
enemy’s position, suppressing enemy artillery 
fire, while providing artillery cover to enable 
infantry to advance, and the ability of trained 
infantry who because of their “strength, condition, 
training, morale or state of discipline” had the 
skills to fight their way forward from bunker to 
bunker. Prior and Wilson give examples of this 
infantry skill in their studies without crediting its 
importance, as in this textbook-perfect example 
of infantry fire and movement on 26 September 
1917 in the Battle of Polygon Wood by the 5th 
Australian Division.
Resistance from “Pill Boxes” and Strong Points 
was encountered almost immediately, but in no 
case was the advance checked. In one case a 
strong point was encountered and machine gun 
fire opened on the attackers. Immediately a CSM 
[company sergeant major] and about half a dozen 
men worked round the flanks while a Lewis 
Gun team opened direct fire on the position 
drawing the enemy fire off the enveloping parties 
who were then easily able to work round, rush 
the position with bombs and the bayonet, and 
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accounted for the occupants and captured the 
gun.37
 Certainly the attacking infantry saw artillery 
as the key to success. It opened the way forward 
onto their objectives, often with minimum 
infantry casualties. They also knew its destructive 
effects when they attempted to consolidate and 
hold the ground they had won. The battle began 
in earnest once the captured position had to be 
defended against counterattacks. It was now 
that the mass of infantry that had been needed 
to capture the position became a liability, when 
the ground they occupied became the target for 
German artillery fire. This was something flesh 
could not withstand unless it was dug in with 
overhead protection, and this could be achieved 
only with time and effort.
 After the Somme, thinking commanders 
saw the need to replace vulnerable flesh with 
defensive firepower in order to hold ground won 
and repel counterattacks. Byng factored this into 
his planning for Vimy; his successor Currie did 
the same for Hill 70 and the fighting for Lens. 
They were not alone, as we shall see in the next 
chapter when we examine the performance of 
Russell and Monash at Messines. Russell, the 
New Zealand divisional commander, wanted to 
halve the strength of his infantry forward once 
he had captured Messines because he recognised 
that too many men forward simply provided 
better targets for German artillery fire. Godley’s 
II ANZAC Corps, wedded to the need to hold 
the front line in strength, which it identified in 
manpower terms alone, would not allow this, but 
Russell still attempted to minimise casualties by 
evacuating the centre of the town of Messines and 
holding it with an outer ring of machine-gun and 
artillery posts that would bring effective fire on 
any attack.
 As this example shows there was limited 
flexibility available to a divisional commander 
in his planning. Much depended on the ability of 
the corps commander to assess the best use of 
the divisions that he had available, listen to his 
divisional commanders’ views as to how they 
could best achieve their respective objectives, 
and factor this into his planning. The corps 
commander then had to propose, convince and 
if necessary argue with Army Headquarters to 
see that this was put into effect. Byng did this for 
the Canadians at Vimy. One can read of the care 
taken for this attack in the impressive studies 
of Canadian achievement by Brown, Hyatt and 
Rawling.38 The careful, previously “unheard of 
training” at every level from platoon through to 
division included a full-scale replica of the battle 
area over which every battalion rehearsed and 
rehearsed until every man knew his job in the 
coming attack, and detailed, specially produced 
maps that were issued down to section-level 
within platoons so that men knew where they 
were to go and pass back information once they 
got there.
 Critical to Canadian success was the artillery 
plan; the detailed destructive shoot to destroy 
the wire and suppress defences in the two weeks 
prior to the attack, the concentration of heavy 
artillery giving weight to the counter-battery fire 
on German gun positions, and finally, despite 
the evidence, a fire plan immediately before the 
attack to provide tactical surprise for the infantry 
when they actually went over the top. Careful 
engineer and logistic preparations matched this, 
particularly the development of underground 
communication tunnels to allow a relatively safe 
passage of assembling troops in the attack zone.
 As Brown has argued, it was a “not glamorous 
but effective” set-piece attack, which became the 
model for future Canadian operations on the 
Western Front. This in turn became a model for 
British armies through the dissemination of the 
lessons learnt by Haig’s staff. It is important to 
acknowledge the lead given by Haig’s armies in 
spreading the word and seeing these techniques 
implemented. Plumer’s Second Army was the 
pacesetter, and the directives and conference 
notes signed by Plumer’s MGGS, Major-General 
Charles “Tim” Harington, are a model of their 
kind. The Second Army preparations before 
Messines in May–June 1917 and then in the build-
up to Passchendaele in August–September 1917 
show how important an army headquarters was 
in setting effective artillery plans to meet infantry 
requirements. These included “[breaking] down 
obstacles which are impassable for Infantry, but 
in doing so to create as few new obstacles in the 
way of shell craters as possible,” providing a 
protective barrage to cover the infantry advance, 
while neutralising “all known hostile battery 
positions,” before providing the consolidating 
on the objective with defensive fire “which can 
be put down when the enemy counter attacks.”39
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 Hidden within the constraints of the 
set-piece attack was the vital flexibility 
allowed by the ability of infantry to 
effectively manoeuvre at platoon level. 
In their after action reports on Vimy the 
Canadian divisional commanders were 
unanimous on the importance of the 
new platoon organisation and tactics. 
Major-General D. Watson, commanding 
the 4th Canadian Division, wrote of its 
“undoubted success”: 
The present platoon forms an ideal unit 
with which to establish strong points, to 
form an outpost picquet with its sentry 
group, to attack a troublesome hostile 
strong point met with during the advance, 
or to hold a section of hostile trench … To 
sum up, there seems little doubt that the 
intelligent handling of these self-contained 
platoons contributed largely to the success 
of the whole operation. The machinery 
of the Battalion in the attack worked 
smoothly, and minor opposition which 
might well have delayed the advance was 
usually promptly dealt with by the Platoon 
Commander or Company Commander on 
the spot with the various weapons at his 
disposal.40
 In the 1st Canadian Division, Currie, who 
was a principal in supporting the organisational 
changes, wrote:
All ranks in this Division now have every 
confidence in their ability to overcome hostile 
Machine Guns by the combined use of Lewis 
Guns Rifle Grenades, which either put the gun 
out of action or permit the Bombers or riflemen 
to get close enough to kill or capture the crew.41
 The two ANZAC Corps had suffered the 
same learning experience on the Somme, but 
the lessons learnt by the Canadians were not 
as evident in Birdwood’s I ANZAC Corps in 
the operations it conducted in early 1917. The 
Australians failed before Bullecourt in the two 
attacks on 11 April and 3 May 1917. Part of this 
was undoubtedly due to the determination of 
the Fifth Army Commander General Sir Hubert 
Gough to push on attacks against what he 
thought was a retreating enemy, despite growing 
intelligence to the contrary. Few subordinates in 
Fifth Army would oppose Gough’s raging zeal to 
press on at all costs, and Lieutenant-General Sir 
William Birdwood was certainly not one of them, 
and so his Australians were committed pell-
mell to hastily arranged attacks against strong 
defensive positions with inevitable results.
 The operations on the Somme demonstrated 
Australian staff inexperience, and this was 
still apparent in early 1917. Brigadier-General 
C. Brudenell White, Birdwood’s Chief of Staff 
at Headquarters I ANZAC, demonstrated his 
superb administrative skills in the planning of 
the Gallipoli evacuation, but the Somme and 
Bullecourt showed that this skill was not initially 
matched by a similar tactical grasp on the Western 
Front. To be fair to Birdwood’s Australians they 
did not have the opportunities and time in early 
1917 for the training and assessment that the 
41-year-old Arthur Currie (centre, pointing) 
was recognised for his ability as a divisional 
commander with a knighthood, promotion 
to Lieutenant-General, and command of the 
Canadian Corps, making him the first non-
Regular citizen soldier to command a corps in 
Haig’s armies.
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Canadians had in the build-up for Vimy, but 
Birdwood was not of Byng’s calibre in searching 
for tactical and organisational solutions to the 
problems raised by the Somme.
 Despite the loss of some 23,000 men on 
the Somme, the Australians produced more 
of the same before Bullecourt. Brave, bold, 
but stereotyped with heavy losses; 4th Brigade 
in the 4th Australian Division was effectively 
destroyed, losing 2339 out of the 3000 men who 
took part in the attack on 11 April 1917. Despite 
the bravery of 6th Brigade on 3 May, the skills 
they showed were not evident in 5th Brigade, 
and coordination and cooperation among the 
Australian formations was lessened by tension 
and friction between commanders who lacked 
trust in each other. In 14 days of fighting I ANZAC 
suffered 292 officers and 7190 other ranks out 
of some 14,000 British casualties.42
 The Australians blamed Gough, British 
flanking formations and the supporting tanks, 
and while the first is deserving of blame the 
others are more of an excuse to hide Australian 
deficiencies. Poor staff work and planning was 
evident within I ANZAC. This led to the failure 
of corps artillery to support the attack at critical 
stages on 11 April. Haste was certainly a factor, 
but inadequate artillery planning and support 
was again a key element on 3 May.43 This was 
matched by command deficiencies at divisional 
and brigade level. As one recent study concludes, 
both the British and Australian formations taking 
part were “riven by factional strife while their 
field commanders wrestled with new technology 
that they were unable to handle.”44 I ANZAC did 
not have the opportunity to change battalion and 
platoon organisations to effect fire and movement 
within the platoon, and this tactical ineptness 
showed in both operations.
 Tactically, in early 1917 Birdwood’s I ANZAC 
was inferior to Byng’s Canadian Corps and even 
possibly to Godley’s II ANZAC Corps. There 
was no disputing the outstanding bravery of 
the Australian soldier, but what the Australian 
experience at Bullecourt showed was that the 
initiative and calibre of the individual soldier 
counted for little unless it was matched by 
effective command and staff skills, which I 
ANZAC still lacked.
 In contrast, Godley’s II ANZAC Corps had 
the opportunity and the time to assess both the 
lessons of the Somme and the success of the 
Canadians at Vimy in the preparation for the 
attack on 7 June 1917 at Messines. This was 
part of Plumer’s Second Army’s attack on the 
critical ridge holding the shoulder of the area 
planned for Haig’s Flanders offensive. Both 
the now-experienced New Zealand Division 
commanded by the New Zealand citizen soldier 
Major-General Sir Andrew Russell, and the newly 
arrived 3rd Australian Division under Major-
General John Monash, had adopted the new 
platoon organisations and benefited from having 
time to practise and rehearse these changes, an 
opportunity that Birdwood’s I ANZAC Corps did 
not have before Bullecourt. We shall examine this 
in some detail in the next chapter.
 While Messines was an outstanding success 
there was evidence, both during the preparation 
and planning and certainly in the commitment 
of the 4th Australian Division to exploiting the 
initial success and capturing the Oostaverne 
Line that lay beyond the ridge, that the staff 
work of Godley’s II ANZAC was suspect. Corps 
coordination broke down completely, and 
although the ground was gained both the 3rd and 
4th Australian divisions came under effective fire 
from their own artillery in the mistaken belief 
that they were part of a German counterattack.
 Currie succeeded Byng as Canadian Corps 
Commander on 6 June 1917, at the age of 41 
becoming the first non-Regular officer to command 
a corps in the BEF.45 He first demonstrated his 
skills at this level in the planning and conduct of 
the Canadian Corps’ attack on Lens. The purpose 
of the attack was to draw German attention 
from the next phase of the British offensive in 
Flanders. It was also to draw the German forces 
into a meat-grinder battle, destroying the combat 
effectiveness of as many of their divisions as 
possible to prevent them being sent north as 
reinforcements to Flanders. Currie’s strength of 
character and determination to do what was best 
for his corps was evident when, unhappy with 
the directive and the detailed instructions given 
to him by General Sir H.S. Horne’s First Army, 
he convinced his army commander that both the 
objective and the method had to be changed.46 
Currie was a man who had to go forward and 
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see for himself, and from a careful study of the 
ground he demonstrated that the key feature 
dominating Lens was Hill 70, which had been 
placed outside the Canadian boundary in the 
First Army directive. Seizing this would leave 
the Germans no option but to counterattack it in 
force. Unlike Birdwood before Bullecourt, Currie 
refused to be rushed and repeatedly postponed 
the attack until weather conditions were perfect. 
The critical ground was seized and, as Currie 
had anticipated, the Germans counterattacked 
furiously over three days, mounting 21 separate 
attacks, each of which was destroyed by massed 
artillery fire backed up by machine guns and 
rifles.
 Canadian losses were heavy – 9198 for the 
period 15–25 August against estimated German 
losses of 25,000-30,000.47 All the skills that had 
marked Canadian success at Vimy were repeated 
at Lens. A successful attack was mounted under a 
carefully planned creeping barrage while German 
artillery was suppressed with counter-battery 
fire, allowing infantry to fight their way onto the 
objective with fire and movement.
 Both ANZAC corps had time to prepare 
and rehearse before being committed to Haig’s 
Passchendaele offensive. Working as part of 
Plumer’s Second Army, the Australian divisions 
achieved a series of successes in the battles of 
Menin Road by 1st and 2nd Divisions on 20 
September; 4th and 5th Divisions at Polygon 
Wood on 26 September; both I and II ANZAC 
corps involving 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions as 
well as the New Zealanders on 4 October, the 
only time both corps were used together side by 
side on the Western Front. Despite the image we 
have of Passchendaele, it saw the I and II ANZAC 
corps employ in battle a level of command and 
tactical skills equal to the Canadian Corps. With 
the men exhausted after Bullecourt, the period 
between May and September was used to good 
effect in building up the tactical efficiency of the 
AIF. It was not the quality of the soldiers alone 
that made the difference; rather it was how they 
were moulded into an efficient fighting team with 
hard training, matched by sound administration 
and leadership.
 This was followed by the failure of Godley’s II 
ANZAC in front of Passchendaele on 12 October 
1917, with heavy losses to Monash’s 3rd Division 
and the New Zealanders. Despite the skill of 
both divisions, lack of corps coordination on 
the part of Godley’s staff saw both Russell’s 
and Monash’s divisions attack and fail against 
uncut belts of German wire. Despite Godley’s 
success at Messines, his Headquarters II did 
not show the same growth in staff procedures 
and planning that was evident in Birdwood’s I 
ANZAC after Bullecourt, with the coordination 
problems evident in Godley’s Headquarters 
during Messines repeated before Passchendaele.
 Inadequate artillery preparation and planning 
at Headquarters II ANZAC led to infantry attacking 
uncut wire. The creeping barrages were equally 
ineffective because of insufficient coordination 
and drive by Corps Headquarters to see that the 
guns, material for platforms, and ammunition 
got forward. Despite the skills of both the New 
Zealand and Australian infantry, they could not 
reach the bunkers and were shot down in the 
wire. Russell’s assessment was that had the wire 
been cut, even with limited supporting fire the 
attack would have been successful. As it was, 
the failure of 12 October confirmed that it was 
the all arms cooperation of artillery and infantry 
working together with engineer support that 
allowed attacks to succeed. Infantry or artillery 
alone was not enough.
 It was now that a reluctant Currie was ordered 
to attack with his Canadian Corps where Godley’s 
II ANZAC had failed. Currie had discussed with 
Byng the involvement of his Canadians in a 
surprise attack with massed tanks that would 
later be carried out at Cambrai. This was far 
more attractive than the mud of Passchendaele.
Every Canadian hated to go to Passchendaele…I 
carried my protest to the extreme limit…which 
I believe would have resulted in my being sent 
home had I been other than the Canadian Corps 
Commander. I pointed out what the casualties 
were bound to be, and was ordered to go and 
make the attack.48
 Having been given the job, Currie got on with 
it. Before Passchendaele, he did everything that 
Godley had not: he insisted on time for planning 
and preparation, coordinated the engineer 
effort, got his guns forward, and committed his 
infantry to a series of attacks that saw them seize 
Passchendaele, all at heavy loss.
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 At Passchendaele Currie found that of the 360 
field guns only 220 were working but not all were 
in position. Key to the success was his demand 
that damaged guns be replaced and that the guns 
allocated, many of which were stuck in the mud, 
had to be got forward so they could contribute 
to the fire plan for the attack.49 Currie and his 
staff went forward into the quagmire to see the 
conditions for themselves.50 His planning took 
into account the conditions that both artillery 
and infantry would face fighting in such swampy 
desolation against a determined enemy organised 
in depth. It was important that the artillery 
creeping barrage did not run away from the 
infantry squelching slowly forward through the 
mire. In four bites on 26 October, 30 October, 
6 November and 10 November, the Canadians 
fought their way forward against stiff resistance 
until they finally captured the pulverised ridge 
on which the village of Passchendaele once stood. 
The gain was a small, dangerous salient poking 
like a finger into the German defensive line, 
subject to fire from all sides. It was accomplished 
by Currie’s corps in two weeks at a cost of 15,643 
Canadian casualties. Its seizure marked the end 
of the Passchendaele offensive.
 As the map opposite shows, Currie mounted 
a series of carefully coordinated attacks in 
impossible conditions and succeeded where II 
ANZAC and other corps had failed.51 Given the 
conditions Currie faced, it is hard to see how this 
wasteland of mud could have been more cheaply 
gained. As we know, Currie made it clear to Haig 
that he did not want the task, and insisted on 
time and effort that Haig was initially reluctant 
to give. Similar demands by a British corps 
commander may have been overruled, but by now 
Currie had a professional formation, valued his 
men, and knew what was necessary to succeed. 
Haig had been instrumental in appointing Currie 
corps commander and would listen to reasoned 
argument, but, while it is clear that Currie 
admired Haig as a commander, the relationship 
between the two men was always a prickly one.
 This tension underlay relations between the 
Canadian Corps and GHQ throughout 1917. 
After Currie had complained about the supply of 
replacement artillery before Lens in July 1917, 
Haig noted that “the Canadians always open their 
mouths very wide!”52 Currie, the citizen soldier, 
showed a willingness to speak out in the interests 
of his corps that was never contemplated by 
either Birdwood or Godley, as British Regular 
soldiers commanding the two ANZAC corps. 
While the tension between Haig and Currie was 
more than balanced by the tactical skill the 
Canadians displayed under Currie’s command, 
the strain between the two men would surface 
again during the German offensive in March 
1918.53
 The tactics employed by the Canadian 
Corps mirrored those used throughout the 
British armies. The principal difference was the 
advantage of homogeneity, where the four divisions 
of the corps benefited from corps doctrine. 
Central to this was the figure of Currie himself. 
He constantly assessed the need for change, 
drawing on both the recommendations issued 
by Haig’s General Headquarters and internally 
from his own subordinate formations. He was 
a commander who had to see for himself, who 
understood the conditions his soldiers endured, 
abhorred casualties, knew that exhausted men 
cannot fight and that battalions had to be kept 
up to strength with trained reinforcements if they 
were to meet the demands placed upon them by 
offensive action on the Western Front.
 Unlike other corps commanders, except 
those of the two ANZAC corps, he was in a 
position to direct and oversee organisational 
and tactical changes in his four divisions over an 
extended period. British corps commanders did 
not have this ability to influence the organisation 
and training of divisions within their corps 
because there was no permanent allocation 
of divisions. Doctrinal changes and tactical 
evolution depended on the ability and drive of 
each divisional commander.
 Currie’s Canadians returned to the Vimy 
sector after Passchendaele. Despite the demands 
imposed by the anticipated German offensive, 
which it was predicted would follow the collapse 
of Russian resistance, Currie ensured that each 
of his divisions in rotation had one month out 
of the line in reserve training and resting, with 
the resolve that “every effort should be made to 
bring the Corps to the highest possible fighting 
efficiency.”54
 Manpower shortages led Haig to institute 
what he believed would be the temporary 
reduction of the size of infantry divisions from 12 
to nine battalions throughout the British armies. 
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By January 1918 the Canadian Corps faced 
a critical reinforcement situation. There were 
simply not enough men in the system to keep 
existing units up to strength. Reinforcements 
came from wounded and convalescent soldiers 
returning to their units; in many cases men who 
should have been returned to Canada.
In the absence of Infantry Drafts from Canada, 
training has been reduced to a science, 
with Physical and Remedial training a very 
important factor. The main sources of supply for 
reinforcements are the convalescent Hospitals, 
and it has only been possible to maintain 
supplies for the Training Reserve Battalions 
by having a good system of remedial treatment 
at the Hospitals and physical training at the 
Command Depots in order that returned 
Expeditionary Force men might become category 
“A-1” as soon as possible, and therefore available 
as reinforcements.55
 Currie insisted on retaining the 12-battalion 
organisation within his corps. He also opposed 
the suggested restructuring and expansion of 
his corps into two Canadian corps, despite 
the opportunities this offered for his own 
advancement to command a Canadian army.56 
The bitter fighting of 1917 had reinforced his 
belief that infantry battalions had to be kept 
at full strength if they were to be effective, and 
that “sending an under-strength unit into battle 
almost always resulted in greater losses than if 
that unit fought under the same conditions but 
at full strength.”57
 Currie conducted a skilful political battle to 
achieve the retention of the existing divisional 
structure. He also achieved the break-up of 
the 5th Canadian Division, which had been 
retained in England, and used it to increase each 
battalion establishment with an additional 100 
infantrymen as well as providing a much-needed 
pool of trained reinforcements.
 The manpower situation improved in 
February 1918 with the arrival of the first drafts 
of conscripts under the Canadian Military Service 
Act. These reinforcements had had little training 
in Canada but were of good material. This and 
the break-up of the 5th Canadian Division meant 
demands from the front “can be met by fully 
trained men.”58 At the beginning of March 1918 
each of the Canadian battalions was between 900 
and 1000 strong and there was a small surplus 
of trained reinforcements in the Canadian 
Corps Reinforcement Camp, in contrast to the 
deficiency that had existed in the first two months 
of the year.59
The sodden misery of victory: the Canadian front line at Passchendaele, November 1917.
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 Currie was also conscious that higher 
headquarters, including his own, too often saw 
infantry as a readily available labour force that 
was too easily tasked to do the myriad labouring 
tasks required in a combat zone instead of 
being given the opportunity to rest and retrain. 
He restructured the engineer and machine-gun 
organisation in his corps to lessen the demands 
on his infantry in battle. The three field companies 
of engineers that had previously supported each 
division were expanded to an Engineer Brigade 
of three battalions and a Bridging Section, greatly 
increasing the engineering capacity, which until 
now had been dependent on tasking infantry as 
a labour force.60 In line with changes throughout 
the British armies he reorganised machine-gun 
companies into machine-gun battalions, and later 
increased the number of machine guns to 96 guns 
per battalion.61
 In addition the Canadian Corps had the benefit 
of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine 
Gun Brigades; each brigade was essentially a 
motorised machine-gun battalion consisting 
of five batteries of eight Vickers machine guns 
mounted in Canadian-manufactured Otter 
armoured cars. The concept was the brainchild 
of the French-born Brigadier-General Raymond 
Brutinel, who was Currie’s Commander Canadian 
Machine Gun Corps. As the commander of 
“Brutinel’s Brigade” he would command a mobile 
force consisting of the two Motor Machine Gun 
Brigades, the Canadian Light Horse and the 
Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion, together with 
trench mortars and artillery. This mobile force, 
unique to the Canadian Corps, was used with 
skill and boldness during the 1918 campaign. 
The 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade 
played a critical role in covering the withdrawal 
of the Fifth Army during the German offensive 
of March 1918, and “Brutinel’s Brigade” had an 
equally important role in the Canadian offensive 
operations from 8 August 1918.62
 In January 1918 training in Currie’s Canadian 
divisions was built around a sequence of three 
weeks’ training that drew its lessons from the 
Cambrai offensive. Every man in the platoon was 
expected to be an expert in all infantry weapons, 
and the platoon organisation was adjusted to 
allow for the addition of a second Lewis gun to 
each platoon, giving each two Lewis gun sections 
and two rifle sections. 
 Training progressed from platoon through 
company to battalion level. “It is most important 
that these schemes should take the form of open 
or semi-open warfare wherein the unit advances 
by the aid of its own firepower and without the 
help of an artillery barrage. Counter-attack 
schemes will also be practiced.”63 Emphasis was 
placed on instructing platoon commanders in the 
use of ground, employment of all arms under 
their command and efficient reporting. Tactical 
Exercises Without Troops (TEWT) or “Allez-Allez” 
schemes were conducted to sharpen the young 
officers’ response to the types of situations they 
might encounter in a fast-moving mobile battle. 
Making best use of technological improvements 
was also practised, such as the use of Stokes 
mortars to provide smoke in company and 
platoon attacks. “Strong points may be barraged 
with smoke bombs to give cover for a Lewis Gun 
team to work around to a flank and many other 
similar ideas can be worked out.”64
 Battalions and brigades practised infantry-
tank cooperation and working with contact 
aeroplanes. The training in the Canadian Corps 
was innovative and impressive, but it also 
mirrored training that was being conducted 
to the same or a lesser degree throughout the 
British armies depending on the drive and 
initiative of individual divisional commanders. 
However, the Canadian Corps evolved its own 
individual approach: “a definite Corps tactical 
doctrine [which] was necessary by reason of the 
different organisation, the greater strength, and 
the particular methods which characterised the 
Canadian Corps.”65
 This bore fruit with the start of the expected 
German offensive on 21 March 1918. The 
Russian collapse in October 1917 had allowed 
the transfer of German resources to the Western 
Front, and General Ludendorff planned a major 
offensive to end the war before the United States 
could mobilise its manpower resources. Apart 
from the Battle of Verdun the Germans had 
been on the defensive on the Western Front 
since 1915, and the French and British had been 
the attackers, the latter taking the lead in this 
from June 1917. Now the roles were reversed. 
Ludendorff had grouped and trained an elite 
force of Stosstruppen, or storm-troopers, in 
platoon and section infiltration tactics tasked 
with penetrating the Allied defensive lines under a 
surprise artillery bombardment. This was similar 
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to British and French offensive doctrine, and 
Ludendorff’s objectives mirrored Haig’s offensive 
ambitions.
 This spring offensive was anticipated and 
prepared for, and the British armies copied 
German defensive doctrine and adopted a three-
zone defence-in-depth system. The difference was 
that the Germans had evolved this in practice, 
while the British armies, on the defensive for 
the first time in two and a half years, adopted 
the form but, as its execution showed, not the 
substance. On 21 March 1918 the Germans 
achieved both tactical surprise and a deep 
penetration at the junction of the Third and Fifth 
British Armies in the Arras-St. Quentin sector, 
particularly on the Fifth Army front.
 The pressure on the Fifth and Third Army 
fronts saw the Canadian Corps extend its front, 
and the detachment on 23 March of the 1st 
Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade to support 
the withdrawal of the Fifth Army. With its 40 
motorised machine guns it fought a brilliant 
rearguard action over 200 square miles of 
territory for some 19 days, with the loss of some 
75 percent of its trench strength.66
 As the crisis developed all four Canadian 
divisions were removed from Currie’s command 
and placed under the command of two different 
armies, and three different corps. “This 
disposition of the Canadian troops was not 
satisfactory, and, on receipt of the orders … I 
made strong representation to First Army, and 
offered suggestions which to my mind would 
reconcile my claims (from the standpoint 
of Canadian policy) with the tactical and 
administrative requirements of the moment.”67
 Currie’s determination to restore the integrity 
of his corps was misinterpreted by Horne, the 
First Army Commander, and by Haig. Both were 
highly critical of Currie’s action, but Currie 
was unrepentant. He distrusted the reduced 
British divisional organisation of nine battalions, 
believing it was too weak in infantry, and knew 
that his Canadian divisions fought better when 
grouped under his command. Currie ensured 
that political pressure was applied through Sir 
Edward Kemp, the Minister of Overseas Military 
Forces of Canada, in London to force the return. 
It was this that led Haig to regroup the Canadian 
divisions under Currie’s command, and remark 
angrily and inaccurately in his diary that Currie’s 
actions kept the Canadians out of battle.68
 By mid-April 1918 Currie had three Canadian 
divisions back under his command in the Vimy 
sector. On 7 May the Canadian Corps was 
withdrawn into reserve. Currie immediately 
finalised changes to his artillery, engineers, 
machine guns and signal organisations and 
commenced training in open warfare offensive 
operations.
Many tactical schemes were carried out during 
May, June and July, each emphasizing some 
definite lesson, more particularly how to 
overpower resistance in an area defended by 
machine guns in depth, using covering fire and 
smoke grenades, how Batteries of Machine 
Guns should co-operate in assisting Infantry to 
get forward, and how Sections of Field Artillery 
could best carry out an advance in close support 
of attacking Infantry.69
 The Canadians were at the cutting edge of 
tactical doctrinal development on the Western 
Front. Currie was the first to admit that Canadian 
skills were drawn both from their own experience 
and from the dissemination of lessons distributed 
by Haig’s GHQ. “These documents were carefully 
studied and, to a large extent, inspired our 
training.”70 They provided similar inspiration 
to other thinking commanders. Monash took 
those lessons with him when he assumed 
command of the Australian Corps in May 1918 
and demonstrated them in fighting his corps at 
Hamel, and in the battles of the Hundred Days 
offensive from 8 August. At last the Australian 
divisions had a man in command who knew 
the value of planning and preparation. Both the 
Australian and Canadian corps demonstrated the 
value of having homogeneous corps consisting 
of fixed divisions, and gained strength from that 
cohesiveness. It was something that Australian 
commanders had always recognised, but while 
I ANZAC was structured with four Australian 
divisions in August 1917 it was not until the 
formation of the Australian Corps at the beginning 
of 1918 that all five Australian divisions were 
grouped together.71
 The Canadian Corps remained at the cutting 
edge throughout the battles of the Hundred Days, 
starting with the Battle of Amiens on 8 August 
1918. At Amiens the Canadians advanced 14 
miles at the cost of 9074 men.72 Together with 
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the French Army on the right flank, Rawlinson’s 
Fourth Army penetrated seven miles and took 
30,000 prisoners. It was, as Michael Howard 
concluded, “the first outright and irreversible 
defeat that the Germans had suffered in four 
years of fighting.”73 It was Currie who told Haig 
the battle was running out of steam against 
increasingly stiffening German resistance and 
that it needed to be either shut down or moved 
somewhere else.
I further suggested that, rather than expose the 
Canadian Corps to losses without adequate 
results, it should be withdrawn from this front, 
rested for a few days, and used to make another 
surprise attack in the direction of Bapaume.74
 It was Currie’s recommendations, backed 
by Rawlinson, the Fourth Army Commander, 
that prompted Haig to widen the offensive. This 
produced a series of hammer blows that saw 
the British armies fight at what we would today 
term the operational level for the first time.75 
The successful attacks by the Third and Fourth 
Armies between 8 and 11 August and 21 and 
23 August convinced Haig that the Germans 
were on the ropes. It was time for an all-out 
offensive, as he put it in his exhortation to his 
Army commanders on 22 August. “To turn the 
present situation into account the most resolute 
offensive is everywhere desirable. Risks which 
a month ago would have been criminal to incur, 
ought now to be incurred as a duty.”76
 This kept the German defenders at full stretch 
and off balance. The Canadian Corps played a 
full part in these attacks from August until the 
Armistice. On 19/20 August the Canadian Corps 
was transferred north to Horne’s First Army. It 
was in familiar territory, facing the outer works 
of the Hindenburg Line at its most critical spot, 
the Wotan-IStellung or Drocourt-Queant (D-Q) 
position that was a critical hinge. This was one 
of the most strongly defended positions on the 
front in country that was ideal for defence. Currie 
had been assessing how to attack it in July 1918 
and now put his plan into effect. From 26 to 28 
August the 2nd and 3rd Canadian divisions and 
the 51st Highland Division under command of 
the Canadian Corps fought their way forward 
with heavy casualties to the D-Q position. On 2 
September the 1st and 4th Canadian divisions 
and the 4th British Division under Currie’s 
French and Canadian troops mingle outside a Field Ambulance
Dressing Station during the Battle of Amiens, August 1918.
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control attacked this and broke through at a 
cost of 5662 casualties. This was “one of the 
most stunning accomplishments of the Corps’ 
triumphant Hundred Days,”77 but at the price of 
the “near annihilation for the ten battalions that 
bore the brunt of the attack.”78 Tough battles cost 
lives, and Currie was both mindful of the cost 
and prepared to fight his divisions to win — in 
1918 there was no other easy way.79 Harris, in 
his study of the Hundred Days offensive, points 
out that Currie almost became de facto army 
commander in his conduct of the offensive within 
the First Army. This continued what seems to 
have been the practice at Vimy where, as Harris 
suggests, Horne, the Army Commander, seems to 
have acquired the habit of giving all substantial 
offensive tasks to the Canadian Corps and leaving 
both planning and execution very largely to the 
corps commander and his staff. This was the 
case during the Battle of the Scarpe, which is 
the name by which Currie’s advance and taking 
of the D-Q line is known.80
 With this critical hinge taken, the Germans 
withdrew back behind the Canal du Nord. This 
was stormed on 27 September as part of a 
coordinated offensive by the First, Third and 
Fourth Armies. Once again without a preliminary 
bombardment on a constricted front, caused by 
the impassable nature of the canal for the northern 
half of the Canadian sector, Currie’s Canadians 
broke in and then fanned out, capturing Bourlon 
Wood and pushing forward with heavy fighting 
towards Cambrai. Currie pushed his tired troops 
and drew in critical German reserves to defend 
the “last organised system of defences” on the 
Canadian front. Cambrai fell on 9 October and 
the corps paused to regroup on the Canal de la 
Sensée on 12 October.
 During the battle of Arras-Cambrai the 
Canadians had defeated 31 German divisions 
reinforced by “numerous Marksmen Machine Gun 
Companies” on ground that had been specially 
prepared for defence over 18 months. It was a 
stunning achievement at heavy cost; Canadian 
casualties totalled 1544 officers and 29,262 other 
ranks between 22 August and 11 October 1918.81 
The Canadians continued to push forward, and 
despite growing logistic difficulties fought their 
way across the Canal l’Escaut. They cleared 
Valenciennes on 2 November and captured Mons 
in the early morning of 11 November 1918; the 
day the Armistice went into effect.
 The offensive operations of the Canadian 
Corps showed its capabilities at every level. It 
was involved in sustained heavy fighting to a 
greater degree than any other British corps. 
It demonstrated a flexibility of leadership and 
command that took advantage of any weakness by 
a skilled if weakened enemy fighting stubbornly 
to hold successive positions. It took in turn 
some of the strongest positions on the Western 
Front. Between 8 August and 11 November 1918 
Canadian Corps captured 31,537 prisoners, 635 
guns, 2842 machine guns and 336 trench mortars. 
Between 8 August and 11 October it engaged and 
defeated 47 German divisions, “that is nearly a 
quarter of total German forces on the Western 
Front.”82 The only comparable performance on 
the Western Front was by Monash’s Australian 
Corps, who under his tight and detailed direction 
also evolved a corps doctrine and whose battles 
were launched with meticulous attention to 
detail. This will be examined in a later chapter. 
Currie has never received the accolades accorded 
Monash, yet I see this Canadian citizen soldier 
as the outstanding corps commander on the 
Western Front and, as I will argue, superior to 
Monash. Canada ignored his achievements, and a 
vengeful Sam Hughes slandered and damned him 
for “needlessly sacrificing the lives of Canadian 
soldiers.”83 Today, outside of Canada, he is largely 
unknown and remains undeservedly in Monash’s 
shadow.
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